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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 1992 the voters of Denmark rejected the Treaty on
European Union (Maastricht Treaty), a plan for European political
and economic union.' The Danish rejection received considerable
press attention and was generally perceived as having a negative
impact on the future integration and unification of the European
Community (EC).2 To date, however, there has been no empirical
analysis measuring the impact of the Danish vote on relevant financial
markets. Financial markets analysis is important because, arguably, it
reflects the consensus opinion of informed investors regarding the
economic implications of the Maastricht Treaty in Europe and other
countries.
This article provides such an analysis. First, a brief historical
review of the events preceding the Danish vote and the historical
context in which this vote occurred will be presented. Next, an
empirical discussion of market reaction to the Danish vote will be
offered. Finally, the market reaction in terms of the overall meaning
of the Maastricht Treaty and other legal documents related to the
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1. See, e.g., Peter Gumbel, European Unity Plan Receives Big Setback in Danes'
Referendum, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1992, at Al; Michael R. Sesit, Denmark's Rebuff Hurts
European Markets, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1992, at Cl.
2. See, e.g., Gumbel, supra note 1, at Al, A8; Sesit, supra note 1, at Cl; see also 48,000
Votes that Shook a Continent, Bus. WK., June 15, 1992, at 39 (arguing that the Danish rejection
may delay accomplishment of goals of common foreign, defense, and monetary policies, but not
the unified market); David Buchan, Mutiny Rocks EC Ship of State, FIN. TIMES, June 4, 1992, at
24 (discussing options for proceeding with European union in light of the Danish rejection).
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forthcoming unification of the EC will be analyzed. This analysis
indicates that the Maastricht Treaty is a far more important economic
document than typically assumed. It also suggests that European
unification is close to being an operating reality.
11. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Background
The most important trading bloc in the world today is the
European Community. Its twelve member states represent the richest
market in the world, with a population of 345 million people and a
total gross national product of $6.2 trillion.3 The beginnings of today's
EC can be found in the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community in 1951, which was designed to restore those two industries
to profitability in the aftermath of World War 11.4 The European
Economic Community was established on March 25,1957 when the six
members of the Coal and Steel Community-Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Nether-
lands-signed the Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty).5 Denmark, Ireland,
and the United Kingdom joined the EC in 1973, followed by Greece
(1981), Portugal (1986), and Spain (1986).6 Recently, a number of
additional countries have applied for membership in the EC, including:
Thrkey (1988), Austria (1989), Malta and Cyprus (1990), Sweden
(1991), Finland (1992), and Switzerland (1992).1 Moreover, Norway
3. See, eg., Linda F. Powers & Fred Elliott, U.S. Service Industries Face Open Questions,
Bus. AM., Feb. 24, 1992, at 9 (listing population and economic productivity figures of the EC
member states as of 1990). But see Martin Fletcher, White House Hopes Free-Trade Deal Will
Bring Votes, THE TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at 8 (claiming the North American Free Trade
Agreement will create a trading bloc larger that of the EC).
4. DERRICK WYATr & ALAN DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 3-4
(1987). For a discussion of the historical origins and development of the Community, see id. at
3-12.
5. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMuNITY [EEC TREATY]
pmbl.; see WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 4, at 9.
6. Treaty Concering the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic
to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, 1985
O.J. (L 302) 9; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 4, at 11-12; Accession of Greece, 3 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) J 7441, at 6201 (1981); Treaty ofAccession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 7011 (1981).
7. EC DELEGATION TO THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE
NINETIES 4 (1992) [hereinafter EC IN THE NINETIES]; see EC Acts to Expedite Admission of
Members, J. COM., July 21, 1992, at A4; Iceland Maintains Distance on EC Membership Debates,
EUR. REP., No. 1792, Sept. 5,1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File [hereinafter
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is likely to apply for EC membership in the near future, and the new
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe have stated their interest
in eventual membership in the EC.8
B. Greater Economic and Social Union: The Single European Act
of 1987
While the EEC Treaty envisioned an economically integrated
Europe, progress towards this goal was slow during the first three
decades of the EC. One obstacle to such integration was the
Luxembourg Compromise, reached in January 1966 by the Council of
the European Community (Council), the primary legislative body of
the EC.9 Pursuant to this Compromise, all members of the EC were
essentially given veto power over issues of important national interests
before the Council.1" This, along with other factors, slowed progress
toward the creation of the single market envisioned by the EEC
Treaty."
Displeased with such slow progress, the Commission of the
European Community (Commission) issued in 1985 a "White Paper on
Completing the Internal Market," which called for accelerated progress
toward ending all trade barriers and restrictions on the free movement
of goods, services, capital, and labor among member states.'2 In
February 1986 the member states signed the Single European Act
(SEA), which took effect on July 1, 1987.' The stated goal of the
SEA was to effect an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital was possible by
Iceland Maintains Distance].
8. Iceland Maintains Distance, supra note 7.
9. See Arrangement Regarding Collaboration Between EEC Council of Ministers and the
Commission, Jan. 31, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 316 [hereinafter Luxembourg Compromise]; see also JOHN
PAXTON, DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 158, 158-64 (1982) (discussing the
dispute giving rise to the Luxembourg Compromise and the terms thereof).
10. See Luxembourg Compromise, supra note 9, at 317.
11. One such factor was a general slowing of economic growth, which made the EC less
competitive economically. DAVID P. BARON, BusINEss AND ITS ENViRONMENT 411 (forthcoming
1993). Additional factors included high unemployment due to restrictive hiring practices used in
order to avoid the high cost of reducing the number of employees, delays in transport due to
customs checkpoint, varying technical standards, and licensing differences. Id.
12. See OmcE FOR OFFICIAL PUBICATIONS OF THE EC, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL
MARKE. WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 4-8 [hereinafter
WHITE PAPER].
13. Single European Act, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1; see also WHIrE PAPER, supra note 12, at 4-5
(outlining the Commission's recommendations for further unification of the European
Community).
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1992.'4 To further this goal, the SEA amended the EEC Treaty in a
number of significant ways. Specifically, the SEA provided that the
Council's proposals for dismantling barriers to the free movement of
persons, services, and capital could be approved by a qualified majority
vote instead of only by unanimity.' The SEA also called for
increased Community cooperation on issues such as social policy,
research, technology, and environmental protection.16
The impact of the SEA on social policy has been particularly
pronounced and has underscored the need for "economic and social
cohesion" in the EC and for the reduction of economic disparities
between the various regions of the Community. 7 Towards this end,
in February 1988 the Council outlined five priority objectives for the
use of the billions of European Currency Unit (ECU) in the Structural
Funds of the Community" and in the European Investment Bank.'9
These objectives are to: promote the development and structural
adjustment of the less developed regions (i.e., where gross domestic
product per capita is less than 75 percent of the Community average);
convert the regions, frontier regions, or parts of regions seriously
affected by industrial decline; combat long-term unemployment;
provide employment for young people; and reform the common
agricultural policy by speeding up the adjustment of agricultural
structures and promoting the development of rural areas.'
14. Single European Act, supra note 13, art. 13; WHrrE PAPER, supra note 12, Annex, at
L
15. EEC TREATY arts. 49,56(2), 57(1) (as amended 1987). Until the end of the first stage
of abolition of restrictions on the freedoms of establishment, the Council must vote unanimously
and, thereafter, by qualified majority. Id. arts. 56(2), 57(1). In general, the Council must vote
by qualified majority on proposals from the Commission in cooperation with the European
Parliament. Id. art. 49. The Council votes unanimously on issues of freedom of capital until the
end of the second stage and, thereafter, by qualified majority. Id. art. 69.
16. Single European Act, supra note 13, arts. 23-26.
17. Id. arts. 130a-130e (Title V of the SEA, amending the EEC Treaty regarding
"economic and social cohesion").
18. Implementing the Single Act, in BULL EUR. CoMMUNrmEs, NO. 7/8, at 9 (Oct. 1987)
[hereinafter Implementing the Single Act]. The Structural Funds created in EEC Treaty include
the following: the European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee
Fund, and the European Regional Development Fund. EEC TREATY arts. 130(B), 130(D) (as
amended 1987).
19. See Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Tasks of the Structural
Funds and Their Effectiveness and on Coordination of Their Activities Between Themselves and
With the Operations of the European Investment Bank and the Other Financial Instruments, art.
1, 1987 OJ. (C 245) 3, 4.
20. Id. arts. 1, 8-11.
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Further, pursuant to the SEA, the Community Charter of
Fundamental Social Rights, which covers the participation by workers
in management, sexual equality, and the overall improvement of
working conditions, was proposed in 1989.21 To date, a significant
majority of the programs identified in the Commission's White Paper
as necessary for the economic and social integration of the EC have
been approved at both the Community and member state level,
although it seems unlikely that all such programs will receive the
requisite approvals before the end of 1992.'
C. Greater Political and Monetary Union: The Maastricht Treaty
Pursuant to the EEC Treaty and the SEA, the EC has operated
as an economic confederation with loose political ties. Each member
state has clearly retained its own political sovereignty and power, and
such sovereignty and power has ultimately reigned supreme over EC
actions in Brussels.' Since World War II, however, a number of
visions for the region have been debated, including the formation of
a true supranational government for the Continent.' The recent
collapse of the Soviet empire and the political realignment of the
nations of Central Europe has caused a rethinking of the role of
Europe on the world scene and precipitated the launching by the
European heads of state of a series of conferences to explore a greater
European political union. This effort culminated on December 11,
1991 in Maastricht, The Netherlands, where the heads of state of the
EC member nations agreed to a greater political union as set forth in
a document officially entitled Treaty on European Union.' The
Treaty was formally signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992 and is,
21. Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, COM(89)471 final.
22. See Andrew Hill, Jokers In Single Market Pack, FIN. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at 13.
Ironically, Denmark is the furthest along in the proposal ratification process, having ratified 92.3
percent of the necessary single market legislation. Id.
23. This relates to the important issue of "subsidiarity" pursuant to which the laws of the
member states reign supreme over those enacted by the European Community government. See
Trial by Subsidiarity, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1992, at 15 (discussing the concept of subsidiarity in
relation to the United Kingdom).
24. See generally EUROPEAN COMMSSION, A GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY 3
(1991) (discussing former French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's vision of combining the coal
and steel resources of Europe in order to reconstruct Europe). Acceptance of this plan by the
Benelux countries, Italy, and Germany resulted in the European Coal & Steel Community, signed
in April of 1951. PAXTON, supra note 9, at 228.
25. See EC IN THE NnETIES, supra note 7, at 4.
26. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter Maastricht
Treaty]; EC IN THE NINETIES, supra note 7, at 4.
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pursuant to the EEC Treaty, subject to ratification in all twelve
member states.27
The Maastricht Treaty goes a significant way towards creating a
politically unified Europe. The Maastricht Treaty calls for the
development of a common (community-wide) foreign and security
policy and the eventual framing of a common defense policy.' The
Maastricht Treaty also calls for the creation of a single European
central bank and for the creation of single European Currency (ECU)
by 1999.9 Under the Maastricht Treaty, greater powers are given to
the European Parliament, and citizens of a member state will now also
be citizens of the European Union with broad rights to travel, reside,
and perhaps even vote outside their country.z' Finally, the Maastricht
Treaty, at the apparent insistence of Spain,3' directly furthers the
"economic and social cohesion" goals of the SEA by creating a
cohesion fund which will support environmental and transport
infrastructure projects in the poorer EC countries (i.e., those with a
gross domestic product that is less than 90 percent of the EC average,
which includes Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece).32
On June 2, 1992, however, the future of the Maastricht Treaty was
thrown into considerable disarray when the citizens of Denmark voted
against ratification of the agreement.3 The following empirical
analysis of stock market reactions in different countries to this highly
significant and unexpected event reflects the economic implications of
the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty.
27. See EEC TREATY art. 236 (amendments become effective once ratified by all member
states). But see David Buchan & David Gardner, A State of Limbo in Lisbon, FIN. TIMES, June
29, 1992, at 10 (suggesting that, although the EEC Treaty requires that revisions receive the
unanimous assent of all member states, government leaders of the EC member states can
determine the rules on an ad hoc basis).
28. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 26, art. G(B), 31 I.L.M. at 255. See generally New
Union, New Upheavals for Europe, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1991, at 13 (describing
the start of joint diplomacy and joint defense as two of the EEC Treaty's biggest breakthroughs).
29. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 26, arts. G(B)(4)(a)-G(B)(4)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 258.
30. Id. art. G(C), 31 I.L.M. at 259 (amending the EEC Treaty to add articles 8, 8A, and
8B, enumerating citizenship rights).
31. See David Gardner, UK Squares Up for Fight Over Finance, FIN. TIMES, July 1, 1992,
at 12.
32. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 26, art. G(B)(3), 31 I.L.M. at 257; see also David
Gardner, Money, Mark Two, FIN. TI M, Feb. 10,1992, at 10 (listing the relative gross domestic
products of the EC countries).
33. See Buchan, supra note 2, at 24.
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III. MARKET REACTION TO THE DANISH VOTE
A. Empirical Method
To gain insights into the economic implications of the Danish vote
for different nations, an events study has been conducted. As
commonly used in finance literature, an events study analyzes stock
market reactions to a particular event in order to assess its impact on
the wealth of investors in common stock. Because stock prices are
viewed as reflecting the present discounted value of future profits (or
wealth) expected to be earned by companies, changes in stock prices
attributable to an event measure adjustments in the expectations of
informed investors concerning the future prospects for business.'
Here, the event is the Danish vote of June 2, 1992 rejecting the
Maastricht Treaty.
Event studies have two basic parts: (1) an "estimation period"
prior to the focal event in which a regression model is produced, and
(2) an "analysis period" in the days surrounding the focal event in
which the stock price reaction is measured based on the regression
model. The market model,35 an empirical version of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM), is employed to estimate stock market
reaction to the Danish renunciation of the Maastricht Treaty.
34. See RIcHARD J. FtwLEs & EDWARD S. BRADLEY, TH STocK MARKET 389 (1987)
(describing the conventional theory of stock prices); see also Donald R. Fraser & James W.
Kolari, The 1982 Depository Institutions Act and Security Returns in the Savings and Loan
Industry, 133. FIN. RES. 339 (1990) (research evidence suggesting investor perception of savings
and loan benefits from specific legislation); Eugene F. Fama et al., The Adjustment ofStock Prices
to New Information, 10 INT'L EcON. REV. 1,12-16 (1969) (suggesting large price increases of a
firm's stock in months immediately preceding announced or anticipated stock split is the result
of increased market confidence of firm's future earning potential).
35. In the context of the present study, the market model is stated as:
4 = a, + 1R, 1 + g, (1)
where
= the daily rate of return on stock market index I for days t=1, ..., n;
the daily rate of return on the world market index for days t=1, ..., n;
a1 = the intercept term for stock market index I;
01 = the slope term, or beta, of the stock market index I;
Z1, = the random error term for stock market index I on day t=1, ..., n, which is id (O,0')
36. See SEHA M. Tanc & RICHARD R. WEST, INVESTING IN SECURIEs: AN EFICIENT
MARKETS APPROACH 278-89 (1979); William F. Sharpe, CapitalAsset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 . FIN. 425, 427 (1964).
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In order to observe the global market reaction to the announce-
ment from Denmark, the following stock market indexes were
collected from the Wall Street Journal and London Times: the U.S.
S&P Composite, Canada's Toronto Composite, The Netherlands' CBS
All Shares, Japan's Nikkei, France's CAC 40, Germany's DAX,
Ireland's ISEQ Overall, Belgium's Bel 20, Spain's Madrid SE, Italy's
MIB General, Denmark's Copenhagen SE, Norway's Oslo SE,
Switzerland's SBC General, and Sweden's Affarsvarlden General. The
world market index is Morgan Stanley's World Index.37 The parame-
ter 3, represents a beta risk measure for a particular stock market
index relative to a world portfolio comprised of stock market indexes
in many countries. Finally, and most important to this study,e1 r
reflects daily rates of return for stock market index I that differ from
the world market index. If ex1 is significantly different from zero on
any day, abnormal rates of return can be inferred in the respective
country.
The market model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS)
methods' for the period February 3, 1992 to May 25, 1992 (n = 80
days). Since news regarding the impending Danish vote may have
leaked out prior to the formal vote on June 2, 1992, the estimation
period for the regression analyses was ended five days prior to the
announcement date. Based on the estimated market model, prediction
errors39 are calculated in the analysis period encompassing the dates
37. The Morgan Stanley World Index is an arithmetic average weighted by market value
of 1,482 securities listed on the stock exchanges of the United States, Europe, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, and the Far East. While 1,482 companies compose the indices, it should be noted
that Morgan Stanley Capital International actually monitors 2,486 of the world's leading
companies which together comprise approximately 75 percent of the total market value of the
world's stock markets. See Morgan Stanley CapitalInternationalIndices, MORGAN STANLEY CAP.
INT'L PERSP., July 1992, at 3.
38. OLS is a method of finding estimates of parameters based on sums of squared
deviations from a known function. See DOUGLAS C. MONTGOMERY & ELIZABETH A. PECK,
INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 8 (2d ed. 1992).
39. For further discussion of calculation of prediction error, see Larry Dann & Christopher
James, An Analysis of the Impact of Deposit Rate Ceilings on the Market Value of Thrift
Institutions, 37 J. FIN. 1259, 1265-70 (1982). For our purposes, prediction error is calculated as
follows:
PE,,T = R.,, - (6c + I3R.,r) (2)
where all rates of return are now in ex post terms. Prediction errors are tested for statistically
significant differences from zero with the following t-test technique:
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May 26, 1992 to June 26, 1992. It is assumed that the model parame-
ters in equation (1) are stable throughout the analysis period.
A comprehensive content analysis of press reports and newspaper
articles on the days surrounding the Danish vote on the Maastricht
Treaty suggests that the dominant factor influencing the relevant stock
markets on June 3, 1992 and the subsequent days was the narrow vote
by the Danish people against the Maastricht Treaty. Business press
coverage of the following day was dominated by the impact of the
Danish rejection vote on stock markets around the world, as well as on
bond markets, money markets, and foreign exchange markets.
Movements in stock prices would capture the direct effects of the
Danish vote on stock prices as well as the indirect effect of the vote
through exchange rate and interest rate changes. As with other events
studies, some unmeasured factors may also have occurred on these
days. Contemporary press reports, however, suggest that no significant
confounding event occurred during the period of this analysis.'
PEI, (3)
SE1,,
where
E I 1 _ _ -+_+)2_
SEx = S2  n++  (4)
x (R,- &)2
with
s2 = the variance of the market model residuals in the estimation period; and
n = the number of days in the estimation period.
In words, SE, is the square root of the estimated forecast variance for day "r in the analysis
period. This test statistic has n-2 degrees of freedom and is Student's t-distributed. The null and
alternate statistical hypotheses to be tested using equation (3) are:
Ho: E(PEIT) = 0
H.: E(PE,) # 0
40. Various financial publications including the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times
(of London) were reviewed, but no major competing international business stories were found.
The fact that currency exchange rates were relatively stable in the days preceeding the Danish
vote, and that world interest rates did not change substantially from the week of May 29 to the
week of June 5 also support this general hypothesis. See Annex, Tables 1 & 2.
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It should also be noted, however, that event studies are suscepti-
ble to a problem known as event date clustering. If the event affects
all firms on the same date, causing such a clustering, statistical tests of
the prediction errors can be biased. One way to adjust for cross-
sectional dependence is by using portfolio returns rather than
individual security returns.4' Because this study uses portfolio returns
for both dependent and independent variables, this bias has been
eliminated. Further, no other apparent major news events occurred in
the countries under study on the dates immediately surrounding the
Danish vote.42 On these dates, the Maastricht Treaty seemed to be
the most important international business event covered in the
financial press. Thus, no other significant news events are confounding
the effects of the events examined here.
B. Empirical Results
1. Overview. In this section the empirical results of estimating the
market model in equation (1) and then calculating prediction errors
using equation (2) in the analysis period inclusive of the announcement
of the Danish vote are provided. The market model is important in
terms of estimating the beta coefficient, or 0. for each country. This
coefficient measures the risk of the stocks traded in each country.
Stock returns vary corresponding to risk as measured by beta. If stock
returns are statistically different from the expected return based on
risk (beta) in response to an event, it can be inferred that the event is
significant in the opinion of investors. This has been born out in the
findings of this article, specifically that the Danish rejection of the
Maastricht Treaty had pervasive effects on stocks listed on EC member
state exchanges but little effect on non-EC country stock exchanges.
2. Market Models. Table 3 (Annex) shows the results of OLS
estimation of equation (1) for the different countries. Theox
coefficients can be interpreted as a measure of the level of risk of
stocks in country I in a global context. That is, coefficients greater (or
less) than 1.0 indicate that the country's stocks have risk greater (or
less) than the world as a whole. All of the countries examined, with
the exception of Japan, have ox coefficients of less than one. The
recent turmoil in the Japanese stock market is most likely responsible
41. See Dann & James, supra note 39, at 1265-66.
42. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
DENMARK AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY
for this exception. Importantly, most of the beta coefficients are
statistically significant. Insignificant beta estimates, however, were
obtained in Denmark, Italy, and Norway. The coincident low R2
values below 10 percent in these countries implies a fairly weak
goodness of fit. Nonetheless, most of the market models appear to be
statistically robustM
3. Prediction Errors. Table 4 (Annex) presents the main findings
of the study. If there were to be a market reaction to the Danish vote,
it would have occurred on June 3, 1992, the day after the vote. In
general, statistically significant negative market reaction was found in
a handful of countries. Interestingly, the greatest reaction was found
in Denmark, where the stock market had an excess or abnormal
decline of 1.56 percent on June 3, 1992.' 5 Stock markets in France
and Spain also posted statistically significant declines-specifically,
-0.74 percent on June 3, 1992 and -0.58 percent on June 5, 1992,
respectively. These- declines were significant at the 0.05 level. No
other significant prediction errors were found for other countries in the
days surrounding the Danish vote.'
Although some of the empirical results were not statistically
significant, their economic importance was potentially meaningful. For
example, the German stock market declined 0.34 percent on June 3,
1992.41 In addition, the Italian stock market slid 1.48 percent in the
four days following the June 2, 1992 Danish vote. Other markets that
markedly declined in this four day period were the United Kingdom's,
which fell 0.90 percent, Sweden's, which fell 0.76 percent, and
Norway's, which fell 0.43 percent.' Finally, over these four days, the
stock market in Denmark declined a total of 1.91 percent, while the
Spanish stock market declined 1.37 percent, and the French stock
market 1.11 percent.4 9
In sum, investors perceived businesses in Denmark, Spain, France,
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Norway to be
43. Douglas R. Sease, Investing Opportunities May Lie Overseas, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4,
1992, at C1 (graphing and citing instability in Japanese stock market over the past two years).
44. A statistically robust model or method is one which performs well on many different
kinds of times series. RICHARD I. LEVIN ET AL., QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES TO MANAGE-
MENT 107 (6th ed. 1989).
45. See Annex, Table 4.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id.
1992]
158 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 3:147
adversely affected by the potential failure of the Maastricht Theaty
while the stock markets in some EC member countries, such as
Belgium, The Netherlands, and Ireland, displayed no apparent market
reaction.' Countries that are not members of (or who had not
applied for membership in) the EC, such as the United States, Canada,
and Japan, did not exhibit any major market reaction to the Maastricht
Treaty news.5'
IV. ANALYSIS OF MARKET REACTION TO DANISH VOTE
A. Overview
From a legal and regulatory perspective, the broad negative
European stock market reaction to Denmark's failure to ratify the
Maastricht Treaty is, initially, difficult to explain. A significant
majority of the proposals of the SEA, the principal legal document
concerning the further economic unification of the EC, had already
been completely approved well before the June 2,1992 Danish vote on
the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, even the complete failure of the
Maastricht Treaty would not appear in any formal legal way to derail
the continued economic unification of Europe pursuant to the SEA.
Indeed, even after its vote against the call for greater political union
as set forth in the Maastricht Treaty, Denmark is still legally very
much a part of the heightened economic integration taking place
pursuant to the SEA.
The markets, thus, appeared to be indicating that the Maastricht
Treaty is a much more important economic document than one might
initially surmise. While it does not address directly a large number of
economic issues, the Maastricht Treaty appears to represent a forceful
commitment on the part of member states to strong economic
unification. If this commitment unravels, so could truly meaningful
economic unification. 53
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
53. Through integration, gains from trade will occur, and the overall economy of the EC
will improve. But cf. Leonard Bierman & Gerald D. Keim, On the Economic Realities of the
European Social Charter and the Social Dimension of EC 1992,2 DUKE J. COmp. & INT'L L. 149
(1992) (arguing that, because of social cohesion in the EC, workers in poor member states and
consumers throughout the EC will be adversely affected as low wages are driven up by EC social
legislation).
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A coming apart of economic unification could occur in various
ways. First, consistent with events immediately following the Danish
vote on the Maastricht Treaty, individual member states could begin
to assert more strongly their rights of sovereignty, or subsidiarity, with
respect to certain issues.54 To the extent member states refuse to
cede power on economic issues to the supranational EC government
in Brussels, true economic unification throughout the EC will be
considerably slowed.
Second, the failure of the Danish people to ratify the Maastricht
Treaty could signal increased future unwillingness of member states to
implement certain proposals essential to the progress of the SEA.
While a significant majority of the proposals of the SEA have already
been ratified by the member states, at least 20 percent of these
proposals have not yet been accorded member state approval.55 To
the extent the SEA is not fully implemented, complete European
economic unification will not occur.
Third, the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty signaled
possible future fissures in the EC and the possibility that the EC may
be forced to function without its full power despite the fact that the
provisions of the EEC Treaty which delineate that power exist. For
example, with the approval of the other eleven member states, the
United Kingdom has already opted out of some more important parts
of the fabric of "economic and social cohesion" envisioned by the
SEA. 6 Thus, while the EEC Treaty clearly states that constitutional
revisions, such as the Maastricht Treaty, must carry the unanimous
assent of all EC states, 7 this may not be true in practice. This reality
reflects the differing opinions held by national leaders. For example,
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl says "we should keep all 12
passengers on the train,"58 while French President Francois Mitterand
argues that "those countries which do not ratify the treaty will simply
54. See Trial by Subsidiarity, supra note 23, at 15 (suggesting, for example, that European
states could exercise more control over influx of goods).
55. See Hill, supra note 22, at 13.
56. See Single European Act, supra note 13, art. 23 (amending EEC Treaty 130A);
Maastricht Treaty, supra note 27, Protocol on the Transition to the Third Stage of Economic and
Monetary Union, 31 I.L.M. at 355; Maastricht Treaty, supra note 27, Agreement on Social Policy
Concluded Between the Member States of the European Community with the Exception of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 31 I.L.M. at 358; see also New Union,
New Upheavals for Europe, supra note 28, at 13 (the United Kingdom opted out of the provisions
for a single currency and labor regulations).
57. EEC TREATY art. 236.
58. Buchan & Gardner, supra note 27, at 10.
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have to count themselves out."59 The Portugese foreign minister,
Joao de Deus Pinheiro, went even further, suggesting that Denmark
might no longer be fit to continue as a member of the EC.6 Certain-
ly, any substantive or de facto economic isolation of Denmark from
the EC could have strong negative affects on the Danish economy.
Finally, the Maastricht Treaty does have some direct economic
impact in terms of its provisions for a European monetary system and
its establishment of a cohesion fund to help pay for environmental and
transport infrastruture projects in poorer EC countries.61  Thus,
countries such as Spain directly stand to lose certain benefits if the
Maastricht Treaty fails to go into effect. Moreover, impediments to
European integration thrown in the way by smaller net recipient
countries (i.e., countries receiving more overall funds from the EC
than they give), such as Denmark,62 could give richer net payor
countries such as Germany a possible excuse to waffle on their overall
general commitments to the structural funds of the EC. Indeed,
German Chancellor Kohl complained at the Lisbon Summit held
shortly after the Danish vote that southern EC leaders did not seem
to realize that there were real limits on German largesse.63
B. Country-by-Country Analysis
Here, we have undertaken to explore the economic impact of the
Danish vote in various countries of the EC and Europe. We have not
considered every EC member state nor have we limited our examina-
tion to EC countries. Rather, we have examined the impact of the
Danish vote in European nations that frequently have a pronounced
effect on the economy of the European Community.
1. Denmark. The Danish stock market reacted very negatively
to the popular rejection of the Maastricht 'Treaty. The market fell 1.56
percent on the day after the vote, and a total of nearly 2 percent for
the four days following the vote.' This reaction is not surprising.
First, Denmark is a net recipient of funds from the EC, paying into the
Community approximately ECU 770 million per year and receiving
59. Id.
60. See Buchan, supra note 2, at 24.
61. See supra notes 28, 31-32 and accompanying text.
62. Gardner, supra note 32, at 10 (Denmark receives over ECU 400 million more each year
from the EC than it pays into the Community).
63. See Buchan & Gardner, supra note 27, at 10.
64. See Annex, Table 4.
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about ECU 1.2 billion-a net gain of over ECU 400 million annual-
ly.6 To the extent that the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty might
jeopardize these funds, a negative market reaction could be expected.
Far more important, however, might have been market fears (not
wholly unjustified given some later statements) that the vote might
precipitate an isolation of Denmark within the EC, which could have
devastating effects on the Danish economy.
2. Spain. The fall of the Spanish stock market by 1.35 percent in
the four days following the Danish vote also was to be expected.
Spain had been the primary force behind the inclusion of a cohesion
fund for poorer EC countries in the Maastricht Treaty and annually
receives about ECU 1.7 billion more from the EC than it contrib-
utes.6 In addition, any possible future general diminution in EC
economic unification caused by the Danish vote would probably hurt
the Spanish economy severely because, in recent years, Spain has
attracted considerable foreign direct investment due in part to its
position as one of the low cost producers in the EC.67
3. France. The fairly sharp decline in the French stock market is
somewhat more difficult to explain. On an overall basis, France
annually pays into the Community ECU 1.81 billion more than it
receives.' Despite this disparity, France is a major recipient of EC
agricultural subsidies which could be jeopardized in the event of EC
economic disunification.69 Moreover, France can be expected to take
a leading political and military role in any sort of stronger supranation-
al EC government that emanates from the Maastricht Treaty, a
leadership role potentially jeopardized by the Danish vote."
65. Gardner, supra note 32, at 10.
66. Id.
67. See Chasing Cheaper Labour, ECONOMIST, San. 25, 1992, at 66 (discussing how lower
wage rates in southern European countries attract investment from northern European
companies). For example, after foreign exchange controls were relaxed in 1985, investment rose
from US$ 5,165,000,000 to US$ 8,000,000,000 in 1987. Spain: Introductory Survey, 2 EUROPA
YEAR BOOK 1988: A WORLD SURVEY 2416,2419 (1988).
68. Gardner, supra note 32, at 10.
69. David Gardner, Southern Discomfort, FIN. TIES, June 18, 1991, at 16 (France is the
largest recipient of EC agricultural funds).
70. See Andrew Hill, Striking Eurocrats Hold History Hostage, FIN. TIMEs, June 24, 1991,
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4. Sweden and Norway. Although not members of the EC at
present, Sweden has recently applied for EC membership71 and
Norway has signaled its clear intention to apply for such membership
later this year.' 2 The Danish vote on the Maastricht reaty could
well put such new membership applications on hold. 3 The declines
in the Swedish and Norwegian stock markets thus appear to be related
to their applications for EC membership and to the restrictive policy
of the EC on new memberships-a policy that is due to Community
preoccupation with internal problems.
5. United Kingdom. The 0.90 percent fall in the British stock
market in the four days following the Danish vote may indicate that
although various forces in the British Government have strongly
opposed British participation in a more unified Europe,7 4 such
participation may be quite positive for the British economy overall.'5
This may be so because Britain has already opted out of some of the
economically cumbersome social regulations of the SEA.76 Moreover,
if the Maastricht Treaty fails, the United Kingdom might be forced to
renegotiate the terms of its participation in a unified EC and could
receive terms less favorable than those of the Maastricht Treaty.'
6. Germany. The German stock market declined 0.34 percent on
the day after the Danish vote and 0.36 percent during the four days
71. Sweden first formally requested to join the EC in July, 1991. Sweden, 2 EUROPA
WORLD Y.B. 1992, at 2577, 2578.
72. Norwegian Prime Minister Brundtland intends to put the issue of EC Membership
before the Labor Party in Congress in November of 1992. Norway, 2 EUROPA WORLD Y.B.
1992, at 2097, 2098.
73. Andrew Hill, UK Plan for Enlargement of EC Likely to be Opposed, FIN. TMES, June
22, 1992, at 1; The Low Road to Edinburgh, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1992, at 48.
74. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has been a strident opponent of such
participation. See, eg., Britain This Week, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1992, at 49, 55 (quoting former
Prime Minister Thatcher as saying the Maastricht Treaty goes too far and is "a device of dictators
and demagogues").
75. This has been the view of current British Prime Minister John Major and Foreign
Secretary Douglas Hurd, both of whom strongly support the Maastricht Treaty. Party and
Principle, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1992, at 55.
76. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; Maastricht Treaty, supra note 27, Protocol
on Social Policy, 31 I.L.M. at 357.
77. The Danish vote would seem to cut back on the need to require all members to
approve the Maastricht Treaty-a bargaining chip that the United Kingdom played at Maastricht.
See Ways Round That Little Danish Inconvenience, ECONOMIST, June 13, 1992, at 52 (citing
examples of additional demands that would likely be made by France, Germany, and Belgium
in the event that Maastricht is renegotiated).
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following the vote. Given the fact that Germany pays ECU 5.5 billion
per year more into the EC than it receives,78 this market reaction in
some ways seems anomalous. The slight decline, however, likely
signals the strong positive impact a unified Europe will have on the
German ability to compete economically with increasingly more
unified foreign economic blocs, such as the emerging North American
Free Trade Association comprised of the United States, Canada, and
Mexico.79 The increased ability to compete appears to offset the
large costs to Germany in being part of the EC.
7. Italy. Falling 1.48 percent during the four days after the vote,
the Italian stock market took a large tumble in reaction to the Danish
vote. This fall signals the importance to the Italian economy of being
part of a unified EC. It may also indicate that given the recent lack
of stability in the political and economic structure of Italy,' the
Maastricht Treaty may afford direct benefits to the country. In
particular, the Italian lira has been extremely weak recently and will
likely benefit considerably from the monetary unification policies
contained in the Maastricht proposals.8 ' The monetary unification
plans are seen as putting much needed discipline on the overall Italian
economic structure.8
8. Belgium and The Netherlands. Falling a negligible 0.09 percent
over the four day period following the vote, the Dutch stock market
had virtually no reaction to the Danish vote on the Maastricht Treaty.
The Belgian market also did not have any strong reaction to the vote,
although it did decline 0.33 percent over the above-mentioned four day
period. These smaller declines may be explained by the fact that
neither The Netherlands nor Belgium are major political actors in the
78. Gardner, supra note 32, at 10.
79. See Neville Stack, Oui or Non, EC Will Still Stand, Bus. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1992, at 10.
See generally Matt Moffett & Dianna Solis, North American Trade Pact Talks Hit Some Snags,
WALL ST. J., July 27, 1992, at A3 (providing background on the ratification of NAFTA).
80. James Blitz, Italian Lira: The Sick Currency of Europe, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 1992, at
2; Tim Carrington, Executives Await Ireland's Verdict on Maastricht Pact, WALL ST. J., June 17,
1992, at A13; see also John Pitt, Europe Rocked by Maastricht Fall-Out, FIN. TIMES, June 16,
1992, at 40 (citing sharp decline in Italian Lira following Danish rejection of Maastricht Treaty).
81. Blitz, supra note 80, at 2.
82. See i.d See generally Glenn Whitney, European Markets Grow More Worried Over
France's Vote on Monetary Union, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1992, at B3E (discussing the fears of
European Market participants that the French might vote against the Maastricht Treaty and derail
the EMS).
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European integration drama.8 The lack of major market reaction,
thus, is not surprising. The stronger negative reaction in the Belgian
market may perhaps be related to the possible benefits the Belgians
derive from having a strong EC government based in Brussels.'
V. CONCLUSION
For the last five years, the European Community has been on a
path towards greater unification. The Maastricht Treaty, agreed to on
December 11, 1991, represents a significant step down this road.
Unlike the Single European Act of 1987, however, the primary focus
of the Maastricht Treaty is on greater political, not economic,
unification.
The Danish June 2, 1992 vote against ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty placed a significant stumbling block in the way of further EC
unification. Moreover, the preceding empirical analysis documents
sharp negative reactions in most European financial markets to the
Danish vote. Indeed, Denmark's own stock market fell nearly 2.0
percent in the days following the vote, and the Italian, Spanish, and
French stock markets all declined by over 1.0 percent during the same
period.
These negative market reactions lead one to hypothesize that the
Maastricht Treaty is a more important economic document than it
might seem otherwise. Additionally, the negative market reactions
also support the hypothesis that there may be greater linkages between
political and economic unification than initially might be surmised. It
is possible that the common market is already here. If the Danish vote
cast doubt on the extent and efficiency of Community trade, the
negative market reactions in EC countries might indicate that those
markets have already assumed greater coordination in the community-
wide movement of goods and services. Given the recent North
American Free Trade Agreement, a strong and fully unified European
Community is required in order to compete in world markets. The
negative market reaction to the Danish vote in many EC countries at
83. For example, the contributions of Belgium and The Netherlands combined equals only
about 40 percent of the German annual contribution to the operation of the EC. Gardner, supra
note 32, at 10 (chart showing payments and receipts of EC members).
84. The EC has 25,000 civil servants who live mostly in Brussels and have relatively high
salaries. See Hill, supra note 70, at 4; see also My How You've Grown, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25,
1992, at 49 (explaining that the number of fulltime Commission employees, most of which are
based in Brussels, has swelled from 5,234 in 1970 to 12,887 in 1990).
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once casts doubt on that unity and highlights the importance of the
Maastricht Treaty in linking the markets of the European Community.
166 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 3:147
Annex
TABLE 1
CURRENCY RATES
EXCHANGE CROSS RATES
Currency May 29 June 1 June 2 June 3
£ 1.829 1.823 1.825 1.816
DM 0.622 0.621 0.622 0.623
YEN 7.833 7.851 7.843 7.828
FFr 1.854 1.849 1.853 1.850
SFr 0.686 0.685 0.685 0.680
NF1 0.553 0.552 0.553 0.553
Lira 0.826 0.825 0.827 0.824
C$ 0.829 0.831 0.831 0.833
BFr 3.026 3.016 3.022 3.024
Pta 0.999 0.998 0.999 0.995
ECU 1.280 1.277 1.278 1.276
Yen per 1000
FFr per 10
Lira per 1000
BFr per 100
Peseta per 100
Currencies, Money and Capital Market. Exchange Cross Rates, FIN. TIMES, June 4, 1992, at 8;
Currencies; Money and Capital Market: Exchange Cross Rates, FIN. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at 34;
Currencies Money and Capital Market: Exchange Cross Rates, FIN. TIMES, June 2, 1992, at 6;
Currencies, Money and Capital Market Exchange Cross Rates, FIN. TIMES, June 1, 1992, at 5.
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TABLE 2
WEEKLY WORLD INTEREST RATES
Market May 29 June 5
London Base 10 10
1 Month Bills 9 11/16 9 9/16
3 Month Bills 9 9/16 9 15/32
Tokyo 1 Month Bills 423/32 4 3/4
3 Month Bills 425/32 4 11/16
Brussels 1 Month Bills 9 1/2 9 7/16
3 Month Bills 9 1/2 9 7/16
Amsterdam 1 Month Bills 9.505 9.505
3 Month Bills 9.515 9.515
New York 1 Month Bills 6 1/2 6 1/2
3 Month Bills 3.77 3.73
Frankfurt 1 Month Bills 9.675 9.65
3 Month Bills 9.70 9.70
Paris 1 Month Bills 9 7/8 10
3 Month Bills 9 7/8 10 1/16
Milan 1 Month Bills 12 17/32 13 1/8
3 Month Bills 12 17/32 12 15/16
Dublin 1 Month Bills 10 9 7/8
3 Month Bills 10 10
Currencies, Money and Capital Markets: Weekly Change in World Interest Rates, June 8, 1992, at
25; Currencies, Money and Capital Markets: Weekly Change in World Interest Rates, FiN. TIMES,
June 1, 1992, at 25.
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